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Abstract
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a non–empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of
player i is continuous and concave in player i’s own strategies. No further restrictions
(such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy
sets be polyhedral) are imposed. In this setting we demonstrate that the graph of
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1 Introduction
The study of topological properties of the graphs of various equilibrium correspondences
is an important ingredient of present–day equilibrium analysis. It provides a unified treat-
ment of such topics as existence, optimality, (in)determinateness of equilibrium and dynam-
ics of adjustment processes. The classical work of Balasko [1] serves an excellent illustration
of how the properties of the equilibrium manifold can be used to approach some traditional
problems in general equilibrium theory. Furthermore, the study of equilibrium manifolds
is of a considerable independent interest.
In Kohlberg and Mertens [6, Theorem 1] it is shown that the graph of the Nash equi-
librium correspondence in normal form games is homeomorphic to Euclidean space. In the
context of a pure exchange economy, Balasko [1] shows that the graph of the Walrasian
equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to Euclidean space. A topological character-
ization of the pseudo–equilibrium manifold in economies with incomplete markets is given
in Zhou [8]. Related references are Blume and Zame [2] and Govindan and Wilson [5] where
the semi–algebraic nature of various game–theoretic solution concepts is established, and
Demichelis and Germano [3, 4] who focus at the unknottedness property of equilibrium
manifolds.
This paper contributes to the literature above by establishing the analogue of the
Kohlberg and Mertens’ [6] structure theorem in a very general setup. I consider the space
of normal form games as parameterized by payoff functions. It is assumed that the strategy
set of every player is a non–empty compact convex set of Euclidean space, and the payoff
function of player i is continuous and concave in player i’s own strategies. No further
restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the
strategy sets be polyhedral) are imposed. In this setting it is demonstrated that the
graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to the space of games. In
addition, I show that there exists a homeomorphism that preserves the multilinearity in
the payoff functions. The result of Kohlberg and Mertens [6] then follows as a corollary to
this structure theorem.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review some mathematical
concepts needed for the proof of the structure theorem. As a motivation for the proof, we
first establish our result for one–player games. The analysis of this special case is presented
in Section 3. In Section 4 we review the structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens [6].
The general structure theorem is established in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the notation and review some mathematical concepts used in
the proof of the structure theorem.
The subdifferential and the normal vectors. Given two vectors x and y of Rn we let
〈x, y〉 denote the scalar product of x and y. Let f : Rn −→ R be a concave function, and
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x be a point of Rn. A vector x∗ in Rn is a subgradient of the function f at the point x if
f(z) ≤ f(x) + 〈z − x, x∗〉 ∀ z ∈ Rn.
The set of all subgradients of u at x is called a subdifferential of u at x and is denoted
by ∂u(x). By Theorem 23.8 from Rockafellar [7, p. 223], for any two concave functions
f, f¯ : Rn −→ R, the subdifferential of the sum is equal to the sum of the subdifferentials:
∂(f + f¯)(z) = ∂f(z) + ∂f¯(z).
Let C be a compact convex set of Rn and x be a point of C. The vector x∗ in Rn is a
normal vector to the set C at the point x if
〈z − x, x∗〉 ≤ 0 ∀ z ∈ C.
The set of all normal vectors to the set C at the point x is denoted by Nx[C]. The normal
bundle of the set C is a subspace of C × Rn defined as
N [C] = {(x∗, x) ∈ Rn × C | x∗ ∈ Nx[C]}.
By Theorem 27.4 from Rockafellar [7, p. 270], the point x is the maximum of the concave
function f on the set C if and only if ∂u(x) ∩Nx[C] is a non–empty set.
The compact open topology. Let X and Y be topological spaces, and let F (X, Y ) be
the set of all continuous functions from X to Y . The compact open topology on F (X, Y )
is defined by the subbase consisting of all sets of the form {f ∈ F (X,Y ) : f [E] ⊂ U},
where E is a compact set of X and U is an open set of Y . Below we list some properties
of the compact open topology.
Suppose that X is a locally compact Hausdorff space. Then the evaluation map e :
F (X, Y )×X −→ Y defined by (f, x) 7→ f(x), is continuous with respect to the compact
open topology.
Suppose thatX is a locally compact Hausdorff space. Consider a mapping f : Z×X −→
Y such that fz = f(z, ·) : X −→ Y is a continuous function for each z ∈ Z. Associated
with f is the mapping φ : Z −→ F (X,Y ) that carries the point z into the function fz.
Then the mapping φ is continuous with respect to the compact open topology on F (X, Y )
if and only if f is a continuous mapping.
The mapping
F (Rn,Rk)×F (Rn,Rk) −→ F (Rn,Rk)
(f, g) 7→ f + g
and the mapping
F (Rn,Rk)×F (Rk,Rm) −→ F (Rn,Rm)
(f, g) 7→ g ◦ f
are both continuous with respect to the compact open topology.
Let C be a non–empty compact convex set of Rn, and let S (Rn,R) be the space of
all continuous strictly concave functions on Rn. Given an f ∈ S (Rn,R), let s(f) denote
the unique point of C where the function f attains its maximum. Then the mapping
S (Rn,R) −→ Rn that carries the function f to the point s(f) is continuous with respect
to the compact open topology.
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3 The one–player case
Let X be a non–empty compact convex set of the Euclidean space Rk. Let F be the space
of all continuous concave functions f : Rk −→ R endowed with the compact open topology.
In this section we consider one–player games where the player’s strategy set is X and
his payoff function is an element f of the space F . A Nash equilibrium of the game f
is a strategy that maximizes the payoff function f on the set X. The Nash equilibrium
correspondence assigns to each f ∈ F the set of Nash equilibria of the game f . Thus the
graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the subspace
N = {(f, x) ∈ F ×X | x maximizes f on X}.
of F ×X.
As we show in Theorem 1 below, the space N is homeomorphic to the space F . The
main difficulty that the proof has to deal with is the possibility of multiple maxima. To
illustrate, let F¯ be a subspace of F consisting of all strictly concave functions, and let ¯N
be the subspace N ∩ (F¯ ×X) of N . Since each function in F¯ has a unique maximum,
the natural projection p¯i : ¯N −→ F¯ that sends the pair (f, x) to the function f is a
one–to–one map. In fact, one can show it is a homeomorphism. It cannot be extended to
a homeomorphism between N and F , however. To see this, observe that ¯N is a dense
set of N . It follows that the only continuous extension of p¯i to the space N is the natural
projection pi : N −→ F that sends (f, x) to f . However, pi is not an injective mapping.
Given x ∈ Rk, let lx denote the linear function defined by the equation lx(z) = 〈x, z〉
for all z ∈ Rk. Consider the mapping
N
φ−→ F
(f, x) 7→ f + lx.
Theorem 1 The mapping φ is a homeomorphism. Furthermore, suppose that F¯ is one
of the following subspaces of F : the subspace of linear functions, the subspace of strictly
concave functions, or the subspace of Cr–functions. Let ¯N denote the subspace N ∩ (F¯ ×
X) of N . Then φ| ¯N is a homeomorphism between ¯N and F¯ .
Proof. To see that φ is a continuous mapping, observe that it extends to a mapping
F ×X F ×F F ,..................................................i× l ..................................................+
of F × X, where i denotes the identity map of F , l is a map that assigns to each point
x of X the linear transformation lx, and + denotes the addition map. Since both l and +
are continuous with respect to the compact open topology, it follows that φ is a continuous
mapping.
Now we construct the inverse of φ. Let f¯ be a real–valued function on Rk defined by
f¯(z) = −1
2
〈z, z〉 for all z ∈ Rk. Let the mapping ψ be defined as follows:
F
ψ−→ F ×X
f 7→ (f − lx, x),
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where x is the unique maximizer of the strictly concave function f + f¯ on the set X. To
see that the mapping ψ is continuous, let S ⊂ F be the subspace of all strictly concave
functions, let +f¯ : F −→ S be the mapping that sends the function f into the function
f + f¯ , let s : S −→ X be the mapping that assigns to each strictly concave function f the
unique maximizer of f on the set X, and l− : X −→ F be the map that sends each point
x of X into the linear transformation −lx. The mappings +f¯ , s and l− are continuous with
respect to the compact open topology. Now the component of ψ that maps to X can be
written as a composition
F .............................................
+f¯
S .............................................
s
X.
Similarly, the component of ψ that maps to F is the composite map
F ............................................................
(i,+f¯)
F ×S ............................................................i× s F ×X ............................................................i× l− F ×F ............................................................+ F .
It follows that ψ is a continuous mapping.
Now we show that ψ maps into the set N . Since the function (f + f¯) attains its
maximum on the set X at the point x, its subdifferential at x has a non–empty intersection
with the normal cone Nx[X] to the set X at the point x. By direct computation, the
subdifferential of the function (f+ f¯) at point x coincides with that of the function (f− lx):
∂(f + f¯)(x) = ∂f(x)− {x} = ∂(f − lx)(x).
This implies that the function (f − lx) attains its maximum on the set X at the point x,
as desired.
Clearly, φ ◦ ψ is the identity map on the set F . To see that ψ ◦ φ is the identity on
N , let (f, x) be a point in N . Then (ψ ◦ φ)(f, x) = (f + lx − lx¯, x¯), with x¯ being a point
of X where the function (f + lx+ f¯) attains its maximum. Since the function f attains its
maximum on X at the point x, the subdifferential ∂f(x) of f at x has a point in common
with the set Nx[X]. A direct computation shows that
∂(f + lx + f¯)(x) = ∂f(x),
implying that the function (f + lx + f¯) attains its maximum on X at the point x. There-
fore x = x¯, and (ψ ◦ φ)(f, x) = (f, x), as desired. Thus we have proved that φ is a
homeomorphism, with ψ being its inverse.
Finally, observe that the mapping φ preserves linearity, strict concavity, and Cr–
differentiability of the functions, and so does ψ. The second part of the theorem follows.
4 The structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens
Let n be a positive integer, and let N denote the set of integers {1, . . . , n}. For each i ∈ N ,
let ki be a positive integer, and let k =
∑
i∈N k
i and p = ×i∈Nki. Let ∆i denote the unit
simplex in Rki , and let J i denote the set of vertices of ∆i. Let ∆ denote the product space
5
∆1 × · · · × ∆n, and let J denote the product J1 × · · · × Jn. The typical elements of Rki
are denoted by xi or zi, the typical element of the product space Rk = Rk1 × · · · × Rkn is
denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xn), the typical element of J i is ji and the typical element of J is
j = (j1, . . . , jn). Given xi ∈ Rki and ji ∈ J i, we let xiji denote the component of the vector
xi that corresponds to ji.
In this section we consider normal form games where N is the set of players, ∆i is the
strategy set of player i and the payoff function ui : Rk −→ R of player i is a multilinear
function. A function ui is said to be multilinear if ui(·, z−m) : Rkm −→ R is a linear
function for every z ∈ Rk and every m ∈ N . Recall that a multilinear function ui can be
written in the form
ui(x) =
∑
j∈J
[
n×
m=1
xmjm
]
ui(j),
and is therefore entirely determined by its values on the set J . Thus the space of multilinear
payoff functions of player i can be identified with the p–dimensional Euclidean space, in a
natural way, and the space of normal form games with multilinear payoffs can be identified
with Rnp.
A Nash equilibrium of the game u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Rnp is a strategy combination x ∈ ∆
such that for each player i the strategy xi maximizes the function ui(·, x−i) : Rki −→ R on
the set ∆i. The Nash equilibrium correspondence assigns to the game u in Rnp the set of
Nash equilibria of the game u. Its graph is the subspace of Rnp ×∆ given by
G =
{
(u, x) ∈ Rnp ×∆
∣∣∣ x is a Nash equilibrium
of the game u
}
.
Theorem 2 (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) The space G is homeomorphic to Rnp.
The homeomorphism used by Kohlberg and Mertens is defined as a mapping
G
γ−→ Rnp
((ui)ni=1, x) 7→ (u¯i)ni=1,
where u¯i is an element of Rp given by the equation
u¯i(j) = ui(j)−
∑
l−i∈J−i
[
×
m∈N\{i}
1
km
]
ui(ji, l−i) +
+xiji +
∑
l−i∈J−i
[
×
m∈N\{i}
xmlm
]
ui(ji, l−i).
It is helpful to have an expression for the value of u¯i at an arbitrary point of Rk. For each
player i, let 1i be the vector of ones in Rki and let ai be the barycenter of ∆i. That is,
aiji =
1
ki
for all ji ∈ J i. Then for a point z of Rk, we have
u¯i(z) = ui(z) + [ui(zi, x−i)− ui(zi, a−i) + 〈zi, xi〉] ×
m∈N\{i}
〈1m, zm〉. (1)
The product after the square brackets is equal to one whenever z is an element of ∆.
6
5 The general structure theorem
In this section we study a richer class of games than the class of normal form games
introduced in the previous section. Now the payoff function of player i need not be a
multilinear function, but is only required to be continuous and concave in player i’s own
strategies. Moreover, we allow the strategy set of each player to be a non–empty compact
convex subset of Euclidean space. In this setting we prove that the graph of the Nash
equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to the space of games. We refine this result
by demonstrating that, if the player’s strategy sets do not contain the zero vector, then
there exists a homeomorphism between the graph of the Nash correspondence and the
space of games that preserves the multilinearity in the payoff functions. This allows us to
derive Theorem 2 as a corollary to our general structure theorem.
Let the strategy set X i of player i ∈ N be a non–empty compact convex set of Rki . Let
X denote the product space X1 × · · · × Xn. Let F i be the set of payoff functions ui of
player i defined on the product space Rk = Rk1×· · ·×Rkn such that ui is continuous on Rk
and concave on Rki . We endow F i with the compact open topology and we let F denote
the product space F 1 × · · · ×F n. The graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is
the subspace of F ×X given by
N =
{
(u, x) ∈ F ×X
∣∣∣ x is a Nash equilibrium
of the game u
}
.
Definition 1 For each player i, let ai be a point in Rki . Let ti : X i × Rki −→ Rki
be a continuous mapping such that for each point xi in X i the mapping ti(xi, ·) = tixi :
Rki −→ Rki is a homeomorphism that carries the point ai to xi. Let ri : X i×Rk −→ R be a
continuous mapping such that for each point xi in Rki the function ri(xi, ·) = rixi : Rk −→ R
belongs to the space F i and satisfies the equation rixi(z
i, a−i) = 〈xi, zi〉 for all zi ∈ Rki .
Given an x ∈ X, let pix : Rk −→ Rk denote the homeomorphism
t1x1 × · · · × ti−1xi−1 × id× ti+1xi+1 × · · · × tnxn ,
where id is the identity map on Rki . Given the mappings ti and ri, define the mapping φ
as follows:
N
φ−→ F
((ui)ni=1, x) 7→ (ui ◦ pix + rixi)ni=1.
Observe that, when n = 1 (the one–player case), the mapping φ as defined above
coincides with the mapping introduced in Section 3. The freedom that one has in the
choice of the mappings ti and ri will be exploited later to construct the mapping φ that
preserves the multilinearity in the payoff functions. Now we state our basic result.
Theorem 3 The mapping φ is a homeomorphism.
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Proof. Define the mapping ψ as follows:
F
ψ−→ F ×X
(ui)ni=1 7→ (([ui − rixi ] ◦ [pix]−1)ni=1, x),
where xi for each i is the unique maximizer of the strictly concave function
zi 7→ ui(zi, a−i)− 1
2
〈zi, zi〉
over the set X i. Note that both functions [ui ◦ pix+ rixi ] and [ui− rixi ] ◦ [pix]−1 belong to the
set F i whenever ui does, because rxi belongs to F
i, and because pix is a product of the
homeomorphisms on Rkj for all j 6= i and the identity map on Rki .
The continuity of the mappings φ and ψ is straightforward to verify. The argument
follows the pattern set by the proof of Theorem 1.
We show that ψ maps to the set N . Let u be a point in F , and suppose that
ψ(u) = (u¯, x). We must show that xi maximizes the function u¯i(·, x−i) on the set X i. Since
the point xi of X i is determined as the maximum of the function ui(zi, a−i)− 1
2
〈zi, zi〉, we
know that
[∂ui(xi, a−i)− {xi}] ∩Nxi [X i]
is a non–empty set. As the homeomorphism pix carries the point (z
i, a−i) to (zi, x−i), we
have the following sequence of equations:
u¯i(zi, x−i) = [ui − rixi ] ◦ [pix]−1(zi, x−i)
= [ui − rixi ](zi, a−i)
= ui(zi, a−i)− 〈xi, zi〉,
for all zi ∈ Rki . This implies that
∂u¯i(xi, x−i) = ∂ui(xi, a−i)− {xi}.
Thus xi maximizes u¯i(·, x−i) over the set X i, as desired.
Clearly, φ◦ψ is the identity map on F . To see that ψ ◦φ is the identity map on N , let
(u, x) be a point in N . Then (ψ ◦φ)(u, x) = (u¯, x¯), where u¯i = [ui ◦ pix+ rixi − rix¯i ] ◦ [pix¯]−1,
and x¯i is a unique point of X i where the function
zi 7→ (ui ◦ pix + rixi)(zi, a−i)− 12〈zi, zi〉 =
ui(zi, x−i) + 〈xi, zi〉 − 1
2
〈zi, zi〉
attains its maximum. As a direct computation shows, its subdifferential at xi equals
∂ui(xi, x−i). Since xi is the maximum of the function ui(·, x−i) on X i, we know that
∂ui(xi, x−i) ∩ Nxi [X i] is a non–empty set. Thus x¯i = xi for each player i, and u¯ = u, as
desired. We have thus proved that φ is a homeomorphism, with ψ being its inverse.
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Now that we have a family of homeomorphisms between the spaces N and F , we
can identify those homeomorphisms that preserve some natural properties of the payoff
functions such as multilinearity, differentiability, and linearity (strict concavity) of the
payoff function ui in player i’s own strategies. We say that the payoff function ui is linear
(strictly concave) in zi if ui(·, z−i) : Rki → R is a linear (strictly concave) function for each
z ∈ Rk.
Theorem 4 below provides a homeomorphism between N and F that preserves dif-
ferentiability of the payoff functions and, for each player i, linearity and strict concavity
of the payoff function ui in zi. In Theorem 5 we establish the existence of a homeomor-
phism between N and F that preserves multilinearity in the payoff functions, and derive
Theorem 2 as a corollary.
Consider the mapping
N
η−→ F
((ui)ni=1, x) 7→ (u¯i)ni=1, where
u¯i(z) = ui(zi, z−i − a−i + x−i) + 〈zi, xi〉.
Theorem 4 The mapping η is a homeomorphism. Furthermore, let F¯ i be one of the
following subspaces of F i: the subspace of Cr–functions, the subspace of functions ui that
are linear in zi, or the subspace of functions ui that are strictly concave in zi. Let F¯ =
F¯ 1 × · · · × F¯ n, and let ¯N denote the subspace N ∩ (F¯ ×X) of N . Then the mapping
η| ¯N is a homeomorphism between ¯N and F¯ .
Proof. The mapping η coincides with φ, provided that the mappings ti : X i×Rki −→ Rki
and ri : X i×Rk −→ R are given by the equations ti(xi, zi) = zi−ai+xi and ri(xi, zi, z−i) =
〈xi, zi〉, respectively. Thus η is a homeomorphism and its inverse is the mapping
F −→ N
(u¯i)ni=1 7→ ((ui)ni=1, x), where
ui(z) = u¯i(zi, z−i + a−i − x−i)− 〈zi, xi〉.
It is easy to see that both η and its inverse carry Cr–functions to Cr–functions. If the
function ui is linear (strictly concave) in zi, then so is the function u¯i, and conversely. The
result follows.
Now we would like to have a homeomorphism betweenN andF that carries multilinear
functions to multilinear functions. The homeomorphism η does not possess this property:
while η preserves linearity of ui in player i’s strategies, it does not preserve linearity of ui in
strategies of player i’s opponents. For the homeomorphism φ to preserve the multilinearity,
it suffices that tixi be a linear map, and r
i
xi be a multilinear function for all x
i. The existence
of ti and ri with these properties is asserted by Propositions 1 and 2 below.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that the set X i does not contain the zero vector. Let ai be a non–
zero vector of Rki. Then there exists a continuous mapping ti : X i×Rki −→ Rki such that
for each point xi in X i the mapping ti(xi, ·) = tixi : Rk
i −→ Rki is a linear isomorphism
that carries the point ai to xi.
Proof. Choose the vectors d1, . . . , dk
i−1 in Rki so that the (ki × ki)–dimensional matrix
A = [ai, d1, . . . , dk
i−1] is non–singular. By the separating hyperplane theorem, there is a
vector s in Rki such that 〈s, xi〉 > 0 for all xi ∈ X i. Let b1, . . . , bki−1 be a basis of the
linear subspace of Rki orthogonal to the vector s. Given an xi ∈ X i, let Mxi denote the
(ki× ki)–dimensional matrix [xi, b1, . . . , bki−1]. Observe that Mxi is a non–singular matrix.
Let Txi = MxiA
−1 be the matrix representing the linear transformation tixi . The matrix
Txi is non–singular, it depends continuously on x
i, and Txia
i = xi. The result follows.
If the set X i contains the zero vector, the assertion of Proposition 1 is invalid, for there
is no linear isomorphism of Rki that carries a non–zero vector ai to zero.
Proposition 2 For each i let ai be a strictly positive vector of Rki. Then there exists a
continuous mapping ri : Rki ×Rk −→ R such that for each point xi in Rki, ri(xi, ·) = rixi :
Rk −→ R is a multilinear function satisfying rixi(zi, a−i) = 〈xi, zi〉 for all zi ∈ Rk
i
.
Proof. For each xi in Rki we define the multilinear function rixi : R
k −→ R by specifying
its action on the set J , as follows:
rixi(j) =
xiji
×
m∈N\{i}
amjm
.
Since rixi(j) depends continuously on x
i, the result follows.
Theorem 5 Suppose that for each player i the set X i does not contain the zero vector. Let
F ∗i be the subspace of multilinear functions. Let F ∗ = F ∗1×· · ·×F ∗n, and let N ∗ denote
the subspace N ∩ (F ∗ × X) of N . Then there exists a homeomorphism φ : N −→ F
such that φ|N ∗ is a homeomorphism between N ∗ and F ∗.
Proof. Let φ be as in Definition 1, with ti and ri given by Propositions 1 and 2. Then
both φ and its inverse ψ carry multilinear functions to multilinear functions.
Corollary 1 The space G is homeomorphic with Rnp.
Proof. The subspace F i∗ of multilinear payoff functions of player i is homeomorphic
to the Euclidean space Rp, the space F ∗ is homeomorphic to Rpn, and the space N ∗ is
homeomorphic to G . The corollary follows at once from Theorem 5.
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6 Conclusions
This paper provides a topological characterization of the graph of the Nash equilibrium
correspondence in a very general setup. We consider normal form games where the strategy
set of each player is a non–empty compact convex set of the Euclidean space, and the payoff
function of player i is continuous and concave in player i’s own strategies.
Our basic result states that the graph N of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is
homeomorphic to the space F of games, as parameterized by the payoff functions. This
basic result is supplemented by two important refinements, demonstrating the existence of
homeomorphisms between N and F that are, in a certain sense, well–behaved.
The first of the refinements shows that there exists a homeomorphism between N and
F that preserves differentiability of the payoff function of each player i in all variables and
linearity and strict concavity in player i’s own strategies.
The second refinement applies whenever the strategy sets do not contain the zero vec-
tors. In this case, there exists a homeomorphism between N and F that preserves mul-
tilinearity in the payoff functions. As a corollary, we show that the graph of the Nash
equilibrium correspondence restricted to the subspace of normal form games with multi-
linear payoffs is homeomorphic to a finite–dimensional Euclidean space. This is a known
result due to Kohlberg and Mertens [6].
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